This paper presents a novel explanation of the decision by a firm to make an input within the firm rather than to out-source the production to another firm. Due to the limited attention of the manager/entrepreneur, time spent overseeing production in-house has an opportunity cost: the neglect of potential new products/markets. Outsourcing production economizes on attention, but writing and negotiating contracts also has an opportunity cost: the neglect of current operations. This paper derives the endogenous transaction costs of writing a contract with another party and shows that positive transaction costs are not sufficient for the optimal internalization of transactions. However, positive net transaction costs results in the optimal decision to produce the input internally. In addition, although there are larger firm sizes of higher value than obtainable under the optimal policy, the optimal policy maximizes the social value of each individual transaction.
I Introduction
The internalization of transactions within the firm is often explained by transaction costs. However, transaction costs are generally exogenous to a model of the firm and usually prove to be inefficient. This paper explains how limited attention generates transaction costs and determines whether transactions should be internalized or carried out through markets. The model provides an explicit measure of the transaction costs of external procurement. These are partly due to incomplete contracts and asymmetric information, as suggested in previous literature. This paper introduces a new determinant of transaction costs. The entrepreneur can allocate attention to negotiating a new contract, which may become an internal contract or a market contract, or evaluating an internal contract. Neglected internal contracts decline in performance due to moral hazard or a changing environment. The entrepreneur cannot freely observe the performance of a contract without spending time evaluating it. When evaluating an internal contract, the entrepreneur may restore its profitability, depending on the entrepreneur's ability, or discontinue it. While negotiating a new contract, the entrepreneur is not evaluating an internal contract. The demands on the entrepreneur's attention from internal contracts determine the opportunity costs of negotiating a new contract. These are the endogenous transaction costs. These transaction costs determine whether the firm "makes" or "buys" intermediate products.
The allocation of attention to writing a new contract also determines how complete it is, which determines how frequently attention is allocated to an internal contract in the future. Whether an evaluation of an internal contract improves its performance depends on the entrepreneur's ability to direct that contract. The proportion of potential contracts the entrepreneur can direct depends on the breadth of the entrepreneur's core competencies.
Markets work best when there is full knowledge of the product or service being sold and all contingencies can be included in the contract. The simplest "complete market contract" is a cash payment in exchange for immediate delivery of a commodity or service. In this case there are no upfront sunk investments by either party and no chance to "cheat" because the trade of the good and the money are simultaneous and the good is a commodity. This is a situation of high market governance power.
When there is imperfect information concerning the quality of the product and incomplete contracts preventing complete warranty, then trades with mutual gains may not take place. This may be due to adverse selection or opportunism after the seller has incurred sunk investments. The seller may avoid transactions that require an investment that has no value outside that transaction.
If the seller requires payment in advance, then the buyer may not receive the agreed upon quality of product or service. These situations become significant problems if the terms of the contract cannot be enforced because the contract is incomplete. These conditions result in low market governance power.
The alternative to trading over markets (trade between two independent entities with conflicting interests) is to internalize the transaction, so that one party controls both sides of the transaction (conflicting interests are decreased). Problems persist, however, if the integrated firm consists of imperfect information, incomplete contracts and remaining conflicting interests. But within a firm there is one advantage. The owner of the firm, as the user of the intermediate product that would have been purchased over the market, now has more control (owning the assets, directing the employees) over the production process. This advantage is referred to as internal governance power. But, internalization is no panacea. Control and monitoring require attention, and while paying attention to this new production process, the owner is ignoring the rest of the firm. Therefore, internalizing the transaction also generates opportunity costs.
The purpose of this paper is to explain how limited attention generates these opportunity costs and the resulting organization of transactions. Among the results is an endogenous explicit formula for measuring transaction costs that explains how limited attention causes transactions to be internalized only if the internal governance power is sufficiently high relative to market governance power, which is consistent with Coase (1937) . However, the analysis also explains why transactions may be optimally internalized even if the internal governance power is lower than market governance power. This is because the criterion for internalizing transactions depends on the relative completeness of internal and market contracts and the entrepreneur's core competencies, as well as internal and market governance power.
There are five contributions of this analysis. The first is to explain how limited attention generates endogenous transaction costs. The second contribution is to explain why positive transaction costs are not sufficient to yield optimally internalized transactions. The third contribution is to derive the criterion for internalization of transactions. The fourth contribution of this paper is to explain why the entrepreneur's optimal allocation of attention maximizes the net present value of each transaction, despite positive transaction costs. Finally, the optimal allocation of attention limits the size of the firm. In fact, there are larger, more valuable firm sizes that are unattainable under the optimal policy, but the optimal policy is efficient. This contrasts with the result of a static model of the firm that assumes that a firm can instantaneously achieve the profit maximizing firm size. The difference in the results is explained by limited attention.
The next section provides a brief review of related literature on the internalization of transactions and a brief history of the uses of the model of limited attention. Section 3 provides the model of limited attention in which the entrepreneur can engage in both internal and market contracts. Section 4 derives the endogenous transaction costs of writing new contracts and characterizes the optimal internalization of transactions. Section 5 addresses the efficiency of optimal transactions. Concluding remarks follow.
II

Literature Review
Transaction costs, once the concern primarily of the economics of the firm, appear in all fields of the economics, finance and management literature.
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Since the concept was introduced in Coase (1937) , the existence of transaction costs have been used as an explanation for the internalization of transactions and a source of inefficiencies in markets. Transaction costs have been used to analyze issues ranging from the effect of transaction costs on the equilibria of a sequence economy (Arrow and Hahn, 1999) to estimating transaction costs (Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka, 1999) . Even policy and anti-trust decisions take into account the implications of transaction costs (Joskow 2002) . The dependence of the internalization of transactions on transaction costs is a central thesis of the literature on the theory of the firm (Kreps 1996) .
The two dominant strains of literature on the economics of the firm are Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Property Rights Theory (PRT). TCE, in general, maintains that transactions are internalized within the firm to reduce market transaction costs (Williamson 1975 (Williamson , 1985 . These transaction costs are assumed to be due to opportunistic behavior by one party because the other party has made transaction-specific investments. The PRT approach to the theory of the firm considers the level of investment in transaction specific assets and alternative ownership structure of existing transaction-specific assets (Hart and Moore, 1990) . In this case, the concern is how ex post opportunism, due to incomplete contracts, affects the level of investment. Reallocation of the ownership of the investments is assumed to alleviate suboptimal investment.
There are several formal models of these two approaches to the organization of transactions. The post-contractual opportunism in TCE has been modeled as a principal-agent setting (Holmstrom, 1999) . Pre-contractual opportunism of PRT is often modeled as a bargaining problem (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002) . In both of these approaches to optimal transactions, the characteristics of trade depend on the existence of exogenous transaction costs.
Other economists have considered the role of limited attention. Aghion and Tirole (1995) use a similar assumption of limited attention to analyze the delegation of decision-making authority within an integrated organization. Bolton and Dewatripont (1995) recognize the role of limited attention in their analysis of hierarchies. Both of these models assume that the opportunity cost of attention is exogenous and the size of the firm is fixed.
The role of the manager or entrepreneur also has a long established history.
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As pointed out in Milgrom and Roberts (1988) , the coordination of activities within the firm requires conscious attention from the manager. Following Coase (1937) , internal transactions are those that are, to use Coase's term, "directed" by the entrepreneur. However, this conscious direction by the entrepreneur requires the entrepreneur's attention and this attention has an opportunity cost. Following Kaldor (1934) the amount of attention that any central decision maker has is fixed. The advantage of transacting across markets is that the price system economizes on attention (Hayek, 1945) .
The issue of internalizing transactions immediately raises the questions of what is a firm and what distinguishes internal transactions from market transactions.
3
As pointed out in Wernerfelt (1997 Wernerfelt ( , 2001 , the transaction cost literature, pioneered by Williamson (1975) , portrays coordination costs of markets as distortions in ex ante specific investments and ex post opportunism, but leaves the coordination costs of the firm unspecified under the umbrella term of "costs of bureaucracy". In the model below, a transaction is internal to the firm if it is directed over time by the entrepreneur. A transaction is a market transaction if the duties of directing the production process are delegated to another firm. Both market and bureaucratic costs are endogenously determined in the model.
Endogenous transaction costs also have been derived in Faure-Grimaud, et al. (1999) in a special case of a three-tier, hierarchical model of delegated auditing due to risk aversion. Rasmusen (2001) recognizes the value of time spent negotiating contracts and analyzes the role of "contract reading" time with exogenous costs of attention in precommittment and adverse selection. The internalization of a single transaction between two trading parties has been considered within the principal-agent framework in Riordan and Sappington (1987) , Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) , Hart and Moore (1990) and Tadelis (2002) . This paper is related to earlier research on the allocation of limited attention. The original model appears in Gifford and Wilson (1995) , where attention is allocated among undefined projects that may be functioning or failed. The agent knows only the length of time since each project was evaluated and the per-period probability of failure. The optimal policy takes one of two forms: the agent continues to start new projects and freely discontinues old ones or the agent 2 The use of the term "entrepreneur" is more accurate in this analysis because new activities (products, markets, etc.) are introduced by this agent. 3. A further discussion of this literature can be found in Gifford (1994). chooses to periodically evaluate the status of each project. In Gifford (1992) the model was applied to the entrepreneur's decision to innovate new products and/or to improve internal product lines. The results explain why the empirical tests of the Schumpeterian Hypothesis of the causes of innovation are inconclusive. In Gifford (1997) , the "projects" are new ventures under consideration for funding by a venture capitalist. In this paper, the model is augmented to include an optimal termination point (liquidity/harvest) for each venture. The issue is whether the VC takes the venture to IPO sooner than the entrepreneur desires. The paper explains why limited attention causes the VC to harvest each venture too soon from the entrepreneur's perspective. However, the result is efficient because it takes into account the opportunity cost of the VC, who has an endogenous number of ventures to manage. Gifford (1999a) takes the agent's point of view in serving a number of principals (a common agent). The agent's limited attention, which makes the agent's participation constraint endogenous, explains why the agent's allocation of attention among principals, which has the expected moral hazard characteristic, is actually efficient, as opposed to the inefficiency result of the traditional P-A model. Gifford (1999b) is most closely related to the current work. It explains how limited attention makes incomplete contracts optimal. In this case, the model was augmented by allowing the entrepreneur to choose the length of time spent negotiating each contract. Longer negotiating periods are assumed to lead to more complete contracts. Internal contracts receive future supervision from the entrepreneur. The production process in a market transaction is directed by the supplier. This future use of attention explains why optimal internal contracts are less complete than optimal market contracts. The intuition is that initial internal contracts do not have to specify every contingency because they can be dealt with as they arise. In a market contract, all control of the process is allocated to another firm. Therefore more contingencies must be in the contract.
The current analysis extends Gifford (1999b) to allow the entrepreneur to enter into both internal and market contracts. That is, the firm internalizes some activities but outsources others. This is accomplished by the introduction of "core competencies" which make the entrepreneur better able to direct some contracts than others. In the universe of potential contracts, an entrepreneur can successfully direct only a portion of them, those for which the entrepreneur has core competencies. If core competencies are sufficiently high, the entrepreneur may choose to internalize a production processes rather than outsource them.
III Writing and Directing Contracts
In the limited attention model of the firm, the entrepreneur or manager generates revenue by entering into contracts with other parties and monitoring or supervising internal (employment) contracts. 4 Each period, the entrepreneur writes a new contract (which may be a market contract or an internal contract) or supervises an internal contract.
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There are no financial limits to the number of contracts that can be entered into. The objective of the entrepreneur is to maximize the discounted sum of future expected returns to the firm.
There are two types of targets of attention in this model. One type is a potential new profit opportunity that can be exploited by writing a contract with other relevant parties, say another firm or individual. This new contract may be a market contract with another firm or it may be an internal contract, in which the production process is internalized. New contracts cannot be entered into without the entrepreneur spending time negotiating them. The other target of attention is to supervise, monitor and deal with unanticipated events that have arisen with an internal contract, such as an individual employee or department of the firm that is the result of an earlier acquisition.
The distinction between market and internal contracts is that the entrepreneur has the ability or expertise to successfully manage some production processes but not others. For the former, the entrepreneur writes an internal contract which hires all the resources necessary for the production process to "make" the intermediate product "in house". Then as time passes, the entrepreneur occasionally allocates attention to this internal contract in order to give directions for unforeseen events. This takes place when the entrepreneur's ability to direct the contract is high relative to the ability to negotiate a new contract. This high ability implies a high opportunity cost of writing new contracts.
A market transaction takes place when the entrepreneur delegates all management responsibilities to the other party to the contract, thus economizing on the entrepreneur's time. A market contract outsources the production process, which is managed by another firm, so that the entrepreneur can "buy" the intermediate product. This is done when the entrepreneur's ability to direct the contract internally is low relative to the ability to negotiate a new contract. This low ability implies a low opportunity cost of writing new contracts. By outsourcing production, the entrepreneur free's up time to write more new contracts, with a high probability of success. For either type of contract, the entrepreneur cannot observe whether the production process is functioning or 4. This assumption is not limiting, as the entrepreneur can be interpreted, for example, as the CEO of a large corporation who is concerned with choosing between strategic alliances (market transactions) or takeovers of other companies (internal transactions). 5. A period may be thought of as a week, a day, or an hour. If a period is thought of as ten minutes, then the entrepreneur allocates attention to six activities each hour, and may monitor any one internal contract several times a day.
whether some unforeseen problems have arisen to cause the production process to fail.
All the entrepreneur knows is the number of periods since a production process was last evaluated and the per-period probability of failure. This uncertainty about the state of the production process generates an expected perperiod return from the contract that declines over time. That is, the expected returns to a contract deteriorate over time when not directed or monitored by the entrepreneur.
At each time period t ∈ [0,…,∞) there is a set of potential contracts from which the entrepreneur may randomly choose one to negotiate. If the entrepreneur enters into the contract, then it will be identified by the period it was written, in case of market contracts, or the number of periods since it was last evaluated, for internal contracts. So a contract written or last evaluated i periods ago is labeled contract i ∈ I + and is said to be of virtual age i. If the firm has no contracts at period zero, then, since only one contract can be evaluated per period, this labeling convention provides each internal contract with a unique virtual age and label.
To keep track of the contracts that the entrepreneur has entered into, let a t be a sequence of zeros and ones, where a t = {a it } i∈ I + . If a it =1, then there is an internal contract of age i, otherwise there is no internal contract of age i. Assume that a t ∈A, the set of all such sequences. The sequence a t represents the internal contracts at t, where a it = 1 means that there is an internal contract of age i.
To represent the addition of a new contract that has been written in the current period, let e 1 ∈A denote the sequence with a one as the first element and zeros elsewhere. Then, for a t ,e 1 ∈ A, the addition of a new contract to the sequence of internal contracts is denoted by e 1 + a t . The number of internal
Each contract generates a per-period revenue that is uncertain due to the lack of information about its state. The probability that internal contract i is functioning at period t is denoted p it , the reliability of the contract i at time t. The expected revenues of contract i with reliability p it , are denoted by r it = r(p it ), where dr(p it )/dp it > 0, r(p it ) > 0 for some i and -b < r(p it ) < g, for 0 < b,g < ∞. 6 We also assume that, if a contract is neglected, then its reliability declines over time. This is meant to represent possibility of unanticipated events that reduce the revenues from the contract. To represent the deteriorating revenues from a neglected contract, assume that p it > p i+1,t+1 . That is, the reliability of an internal 6. The time period t is subsumed when it plays no direct role in the description of the model. Once the model is completely described, the problem will be stationary, and the time period will be of no relevance contract declines over time. The two sequences, a t and p t ,, define the state at period t.
The entrepreneur has some ability to restore the production process of an internal contract by evaluating it. If an internal contract is evaluated, it may be found to be functioning, in which case, the actual current revenue is g > 0, or it may be failed, in which case the actual current revenue is -b < 0. A failed internal contract can be restored to a functioning internal contract with probability ρ, where 0 < ρ ≤ 1. This parameter reflects the entrepreneur's internal governance power. Since an internal contract i is functioning with probability p i , and is failed with probability 1− p i , but restored with probability ρ, the probability that an evaluated internal contract i is functioning after evaluation in period t is ρ i (p it ) ≡ p it + (1−p it )ρ. The entrepreneur's ability to restore a failed production process represents the entrepreneur's core competencies, which can vary among entrepreneurs.
To represent the heterogeneity of contracts, assume that a new contract that matches the entrepreneur's core competencies becomes an internal contract. This occurs if the probability that the entrepreneur can successfully direct the contract has ρ ≥ x, for some x ∈ (0,1).
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Some new contracts will be within the entrepreneur's core competencies and some will not. To keep this simple, assume that there are two levels of ρ, high and low, and that each potential new contract has a ρ ∈{ρ − , ρ − }, where 0 < ρ − < ρ − < 1. In the set of all potential new contracts, a proportion ω have ρ = ρ − and are said to be within the entrepreneur's core competencies. To enter into a new contract, the entrepreneur must divert attention away from any internal contracts in order to try to negotiate a new contract. Negotiations are successful with probability ρ 0 . This parameter reflects the governance power of markets; that is, the likelihood that the contract can be successfully negotiated.
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At the beginning of period t, the entrepreneur observes the current state (a t , p t ) and may keep any subset of internal contracts and freely discard the rest. Denote this decision at t by q t = q(a t ,t)∈ A. Simultaneously, the entrepreneur chooses a contract to evaluate. Let the entrepreneur's allocation of attention 7. The value of x is defined in Theorem 1. 8. The structure of the model can be clearly understood by the following analogy. Imagine a juggler on the "Ed Sullivan Show" who is rewarded according to the number of plates he can spin on the tips of long sticks. There are an infinite number pf plates and sticks. As soon as one plate is spinning, he can set up another one. However, as he continues to set up additional spinning plates, the first one starts to wobble, threatening to fall. The choice the juggler faces is to either continue to set up new plates or to go back and try to respin old plates. New plates may or may not be balanced (ρ 0 ) and plates that have fallen may be broken (1-ρ i ). decision at t be denoted by u t = u(a t ,t) ∈ I + , where u t = i > 0 if an internal contract i is evaluated and u t = 0 if a new contract is evaluated. Let the policy space be defined as Λ (a t ,t) = {u λ (a t ,t), q λ (a t ,t) : q it ≤ a it , and u t > 0 implies a ut = q ut = 1}. That is, the entrepreneur can retain only those contracts already entered into, and if an internal contract is to be evaluated, it must be retained. The total expected current revenues from internal contracts q t is R(q t ) = ∑ ∞ =1 i r i q it To define the transition of the state, let S:A → A be the shift operator which advances all components by one place, i.e., ignoring the t subscripts, (Sa) 1 = 0 and (Sa) j = a j-1 , for j > 1. Thus a 1 is always zero and the contract of age i becomes the contract of age i+1. For any q ∈ A and u = i ∈ I + , let q -i denote the sequence q′ with q i ′ = 0 and q j ′ = q j , for j ≠ i and let q -0 = q. If a new contract is evaluated, that is u = 0, and q is the set of internal contracts that are retained, then the next state is e 1 + Sq -0 with probability ρ 0 and it is Sq -0 with probability 1−ρ 0 . If a internal contract of age i is evaluated, that is u = i > 0, then the next state is e 1 +Sq -i with probability ρ i and it is Sq -i with probability 1−ρ i .
Using a discount factor β, where 0 < β < 1, and given the initial state a 0 , the objective of the entrepreneur is to maximize the discounted expected returns to the firm over the set of all policies λ ∈ Λ (a 0 ,0) prescribing decision function pairs {u λ (a t ,t), q λ (a t ,t)}. For any policy λ, any state a t ∈ A and any t, let a λ (a t ,t) be the random variable which defines the next state a t+1 after the use of policy λ for one period in state a t . If q λt = q λ (a t ,t), then the value of the state (a t ,t) is
Since the problem is stationary, it follows that, for all t ≥ 0 and a t ∈ A, F(a t ,t) = F(a t ). In order for F to be well defined, it is sufficient that R(a t ) is bounded. Since −bN(a t ) < R(a t ) < gN(a t ), it follows that R(a t ) is bounded if N t = N(a t ) is bounded. The first theorem in Gifford and Wilson (1995) establishes that a unique optimal policy does exist despite the possibility of an infinite number of contracts.
Since an upper bound exists we can limit the state space of contracts to A m = {a: a i = 0, for i > m}. Since the problem is stationary, we can limit the policy space to stationary policies λ(a t ) = {u λ (a t ), q λ (a t )} ∈ Λ (a t ). The optimality equation then becomes
In Gifford (1999b) , the optimal completeness of internal contracts is explained by limited attention. Given that time has an opportunity cost, the optimal amount of time to spend writing each contract is derived.
Proposition 1:
The optimal length of time to spend writing a market contract is finite, implying that optimal market contracts are incomplete. Proposition 2: The optimal length of time to spend writing an internal contract is finite, implying that optimal internal contracts are incomplete. Proposition 3: The optimal completeness of an internal contract is decreasing in the ability of the entrepreneur to direct the contract in the future and is increasing in the ability of the entrepreneur to write new contracts. Proposition 4: The optimal number of periods between the evaluations of an internal contract is weakly increasing in the completeness of the contract.
From these Propositions the following conclusion can be drawn. A greater ability to direct internal contracts (higher ρ) implies that internal contracts are less complete because problems can be dealt with as they come up with a high probability of success. However, a higher ability to negotiate new contracts implies that internal contracts are more complete, thus requiring less attention in the future. This allows the entrepreneur to allocate more attention to writing new contracts, which has a high probability of success. Thus the opportunity cost of attending to internal contracts implied by the probability of successfully writing a new contract manifests itself in more complete internal contracts and a reduced frequency of attending to them.
Also from Gifford (1999b), we have this last proposition. It implies that more time is spent writing market contracts than internal contracts. Proposition 5: If the contract-writing technology is the same for market and internal contracts, then market contracts are more complete, ex ante, than internal contracts. The intuition of this result is that internal contracts can be modified in the future as unanticipated events occur while the supervision of market contracts is delegated to the other firm. Now we need to write the expected discounted return for an internal contract and for a market contract. These are needed to describe the optimal policy. If a contract of age 1 is retained for i periods and then discarded unevaluated at age i+1, then the discounted expected returns to this contract are
. Let V d ≡ sup i V i denote the incremental expected discounted returns from a contract of age 1 if it is held until age d and then discarded unevaluated, where d is the value of i that maximizes V i . This represents the expected value of a market contract.
Let W i (ρ) denote the incremental returns from a contract of age one that is evaluated every i periods for one period instead of writing a new contract. An internal contract of age one generates expected returns V i = If it is then evaluated, it is restored to a contract of age one with probability ρ i and is discarded with probability (1−ρ i ). However, there is an opportunity cost because that time could have been used to negotiate a new contract, which with probability (1−ω) would be a market contract and with probability ω would be an internal contract.
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To account for the differences in the completeness of market and internal contracts, assume that writing a new contract that will be internal to the firm takes a whole period, which could be used to write a portion α of a new market contract; that is, a market contract requires 1/α of a full period, where 0 < α < 1. We assume that an entrepreneur has core competencies if W c (ρ − ) ≥ αV d and assume that W c (ρ − ) < αV d . This insures that the entrepreneur adopts both internal and market contracts. Then
Solving for W i (ρ − ) yields
Let c denote the value of i which maximizes W i (ρ) over all positive integers i. That is, the optimal direction age c is the smallest i which satisfies W i+1 (ρ) < W i (ρ). Now consider the policy π which specifies that, if a new contract is successfully negotiated and found to have ρ = ρ − , then it is becomes a market contract in the next period and is discarded unevaluated at the age of d+1. If, however, the newly negotiated contract is found to have manageability ρ = ρ − , then policy π specifies that this becomes an internal contract that is evaluated every c periods. If there is no internal contract of age c, then a new contract is evaluated. From Gifford and Wilson (1995) we have the following unique optimal policy. Proposition 6: The optimal policy is π, where, for a ∈ A d+1
Proposition 6 states that, if the firm begins with no contracts, then the optimal policy prescribes one of two best approaches to carrying out transactions, depending on the value of ρ, the ability of the entrepreneur to direct that contract. This optimal policy takes into consideration the fact that, when choosing to negotiate a new contract, the entrepreneur does not know whether successful negotiations will lead to an internal contract (ρ = ρ − ) or a market contract (ρ = ρ − ).
The next theorem characterizes the minimum ρ − for some contracts to be optimally internalized. 
Since only contracts with ρ = ρ − will be internalized, notation for the value of an internal contract will be abbreviated to W c = W c (ρ − ). Theorem 1 does not imply, however, that internalization requires that internal governance power be greater than market governance power. Contracts may be optimally internalized even if the internal governance power is lower than the market governance power.
Corollary: If contracts are internalized when
From the corollary, contracts may be optimally internalized even if the probability of restoring an internal contract is less than the probability of successfully negotiating a new contract. This occurs if and only if an internal contract replaces a sufficiently small portion of a market contract; that is, when market contracts
take much longer to write than internal contracts. The entrepreneur writes a simple internal contract rather than a long detailed market contract. Notice that the share of new internal contracts, ω, does not appear in (1) and so the optimal rule is independent of the scope of the entrepreneur's core competencies and is identical to the rule in Gifford (1999b) . However, the value of c does depend on ω, as we will see below.
In general, contracts are internalized because the entrepreneur has a relatively high ability to successfully supervise these internal contracts; that is, ρ c is sufficiently high relative to ρ 0 . This also depends on the frequency with which these contracts are supervised. Theorem 2: The optimal evaluation age for internal contracts is the largest integer i that satisfies W i-1 < W i which is equivalent to
The first term of the right hand side is the discounted expected value of directing internal contract i−1 this period and then negotiating a new contract in the next period. The second term of the right hand side is the discounted expected value of negotiating a new contract in the current period and the contract i in the next period. The largest i that satisfies (2) is the i that maximizes W i . This optimal number of periods that the entrepreneur can ignore an internal contract, denoted by c, also implies an upper bound on the size of the firm. That is, the entrepreneur cannot supervise more than c internal contracts if each is supervised every c periods. From Theorem 1 we have that c < d, where d+1 is the smallest integer for which r(p d ) < 0. In addition, since c < d, internal contracts are supervised before their expected current returns fall to zero.
The main result in Theorem 1 implies that the optimal internalization of transactions depends on two parameters, ρ and ρ 0 . Therefore, it is important to understand what these parameters represent. If we think of an internal contract as an employee contract, then the ability of the entrepreneur to direct this employee, ρ, is affected by post contractual opportunism. If post contractual opportunism is hard to correct, then ρ is small. This may be the result of moral hazard due to an inability to measure the productivity of this employee, even when monitored. It can also be due to specific assets. According to Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), the specificity of assets can lead to inefficient behavior after contracting in an effort to extract the quasi rents generated by the specific assets. Therefore, moral hazard and specific assets tend to lower ρ.
The entrepreneur's ability to negotiate a new contract, ρ 0 , may be low because of adverse selection due to asymmetric information about the abilities of the new employee or supplier. It may also be low in the presence of noncontractible specific assets. If the two parties cannot write an enforceable contract, then there is a possibility of hold up. Anticipating this hold up, the parties will not reach an agreement and no new contract is written. Property rights theory (PRT) argues that specific assets can lead to underinvestment in noncontractible assets. They can also lead to no investment and no contract. Therefore, ρ 0 depends on adverse selection and specific assets. Notice that transaction specific assets can reduce both ρ and ρ 0 . The nature of the relationship between specific assets and performance is a complicated and best dealt with in a separate paper.
11 Whinston (2001) views these two theories, TCE and PRT, as competing attempts to explain the integration of activities within firms. The analysis above explains how both effects can be present at once. With this interpretation of the parameters ρ and ρ 0 , neither theory alone determines whether transactions are internalized. Instead, transactions are internalized if and only if post-contractual opportunism is sufficiently low relative to pre-contractual opportunism, and transaction-specific assets have a sufficiently lower negative effect on internal governance power than on market governance power.
The main implication of Theorem 1 is that the optimal internalization of transactions depends on the demands on limited attention from transacting over markets and transacting internally. Transactions are internalized only if the allocation of attention to directing internal contracts is sufficiently productive relative to allocating attention to writing a new contract. Using this framework, we turn next to the derivation of the endogenous costs of transacting over markets.
IV Endogenous Transaction Costs
The distinction between making (internalization) and buying (trading over markets) is that some contracts are most profitable if directed within the firm. These are the contracts for which the firm has core competencies. These contracts will receive periodic attention because the entrepreneur has the ability to supervise these contracts to correct post-contractual opportunism. Contracts that are not among the firm's core competency are traded over markets. In this case, the entrepreneur delegates this supervision to another firm. This decision to internalize some contracts and to outsource others can also be posed in terms of transaction costs.
Transaction costs are defined here as the opportunity cost of negotiating and writing a new contract. This endogenous opportunity cost is reflected in the forgone expected value of directing an internal contract. If there is any internal contract i then this opportunity costs is at least
This is the expected value of directing contract i this period and delaying the negotiation of a new contract until the next period, which may be a market contract or an internal contract. This measure of transaction costs is endogenous because it depends on c, the age at which internal contracts are directed, which is a choice variable of the entrepreneur. Note that transaction costs are positive. We will see that positive transaction costs are not sufficient to determine which transactions to internalize.
To do this, we will define net transaction costs to take into account the expected benefit of writing a new contract,
This is the expected value of leaving contract i unattended for one more period while writing a new contract this period, which may be a market contract or an internal contract, and then directing contract c+1 next period. Therefore net transaction costs are
Theorem 3: Net transaction costs are positive if there exists a c ≤ d that satisfies
The implication of Theorem 3 is that the optimal policy of the problem of allocating limited attention between outsourcing contracts and directing them internally generates the same decision as comparing the transaction costs of writing a new contract with the expected benefit of writing a new contract. That is, under the optimal policy, a new contract will not be written if there is an internal contract that has been neglected for c periods and so warrants attention.
This condition is equivalent to positive net transaction costs. This formalizes one of the arguments of the transaction cost literature on the relationship between transaction costs and the formation of firms. However, the entrepreneur does not need to calculate net transaction costs. The formula in (1) provides the same decision and is easy to calculate. Having a formal measure of transaction costs makes explicit the relationships between transaction costs and the governance power of markets and hierarchies. However, it turns out that these relationships are quite complicated. From the measure of transaction costs in (3), it appears that transaction costs increase with the parameter ρ 0 , which measures market governance power. This is clearly counter-intuitive. However, for net transaction costs,
the direct effect of higher market governance power is to reduce NTC. It should be noted, however, that both the ability to direct internal contracts, ρ, and the ability to write new contracts, ρ 0 , have direct and indirect effects on NTC. The direct effects are that a greater ability to direct internal contracts or a lower ability to write new contracts each increases NTC. The indirect effects come from the fact that these parameters also affect the optimal completeness of contracts and, therefore, the fraction α of a market contract that is lost due to directing an internal contract, and the optimal age c at which internal contracts are directed. From previous research (Gifford, 1999b) we know that the value of an internal contract, W c (ρ − ), is increasing in ρ − and that the optimal age, c, at which to direct an internal contract is increasing in ρ − .
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However, the optimal completeness of an internal contract, measured by α, decreases with ρ − and the direction age increases with the completeness of the contract. There are similarly ambiguous effects of market governance power on NTC. Therefore, the net effect of ρ − and ρ 0 on NTC are quite complicated and left for future research. This may provide a clue as to why the effects of transactions costs on firm formation are so contentious. The effects of market and internal governing power on the internalization of transaction are complex.
12. These issues are addressed in Gifford (1999b) for ω ∈ {0,1} and ρ i =ρ, for all i.
V Efficient Optimal Transactions
Finally, we address the social welfare implications of the endogenous transaction costs due to limited attention. Since there is only one agent in this model, the criterion for social optimality is to maximize the total gain from allocating attention among transactions. This is equivalent to maximizing the total value of all contracts. The social gains from allocating attention to a contract are the expected discounted total net returns from that contract. For a market contract, this is maximized by maximizing V i , since this is the benefit from the transaction and there are no other costs. Therefore, since the entrepreneur chooses i = d to maximize V i , the value of each market transaction is maximized.
The case is not so simple for internal contracts. The question of the efficiency of internal transactions arises from the fact that these contracts are directed before their current returns fall to zero. This implies that the i which maximizes W i does not maximize the present values of expected returns
. This is due to the endogenous transaction costs caused by limited attention. However, optimal internal transactions are efficient despite positive transaction costs.
For an internal contract, denote the incremental social gain as G j ≡ B j − C j , the social benefits minus the social costs, for any frequency of attention j.
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Since an internal contract may be discontinued if profits cannot be improved, the s+1 allocation of attention to the contract occurs with probability ρ s j . Therefore, the discounted expected social benefit of the allocation of the entrepreneur's attention to an internal transaction every j periods is B j ≡ ∑ 
. Therefore, the discounted expected incremental social value of an internal contract that is allocated attention every j periods is
Note that (7) is equivalent to
13. For brevity we will call the number of periods i between the allocations of attention to an internal transaction the "frequency" of attention although 1/i is a more accurate indication of this frequency.
Solving for G j results in
Since G j = W j , choosing j to maximize W j also maximizes net social benefits. From (3) we have that transaction costs are always positive if contracts are internalized. However, the allocation of attention is efficient. Theorem 4: The optimal allocation of attention implies positive transaction costs, maximizes the value of each transaction and the value of the firm, but does not attain larger, more valuable firm sizes. Since transaction costs are always positive, this implies that positive transaction costs do not necessarily imply inefficiency in the individual transactions. Even positive net transaction costs do not imply inefficiency in individual transactions, since the optimal allocation of attention maximizes net social value of the transaction by internalizing the transaction. However, there are larger firm sizes that are unattainable under the optimal policy, but are more valuable.
If a firm had n > c internal contracts of age 1,…,n, then, if n < d, this firm is more valuable than any firm size attainable by the optimal policy. The difference is that a firm that instantaneously acquires n internal transactions bears no cost of acquiring those transactions. This is similar to calculating the optimal long run firm size in a competitive market at the minimum efficient scale while assuming that the firm can attain this size instantaneously. If attention must be allocated to attaining that firm size, then it will not be attainable by the optimal policy. In fact, the minimum efficient scale is not efficient if its value does not take into account the costs of growth due to limited attention. Moreover, the effects of transaction costs on the efficiency of transactions cannot be observed by studying individual transactions. Assuming that the transaction is the unit of analysis ignores the opportunity costs of attention that can be allocated to another transaction. Transaction costs can be observed only when the firm as a whole is analyzed.
VI Conclusion
This paper has shown how limited attention determines the optimal organization of transaction which leads to a number of implications. The opportunity cost of attention, embodied in neglected internal contracts, provides an explicit measure of endogenous transaction costs. As long as some contracts are internalized, transaction costs are positive. Internal contracts are optimally evaluated before their returns equal zero, implying that the endogenous opportunity cost of writing a new contract not only limits the size of the firm, but prevents the firm from attaining a larger, more valuable firm size. The optimal allocation of attention is consistent with the intuition that internal governance power and market governance power matter, but not in a simple relationship. The relative completeness of contracts, the proportion of new contracts that are within the entrepreneur's core competencies, and the rate of deterioration in the returns to internal and market contracts also affect whether transaction are internal or over markets. In fact, contracts may be optimally internalized even if the internal governance power is less that the market governance power. Finally, transactions are optimally internalized if and only if the net transaction costs are positive and this corresponds to a relatively simple formula.
To apply the optimal policy, the entrepreneur needs only a sense of the likelihood that any failing internal operations can be corrected with attention from the entrepreneur. In addition, the entrepreneur must have a sense of the likelihood that efforts to engage in new transactions will be successful. Whether a new transaction will be internalized or not is independent of the proportion of new transactions that are within the entrepreneur's core competencies. Therefore, the information required to implement the optimal policy is minimal.
The analysis above differs from the traditional literature on transaction costs in its reliance on formal mathematical modeling.
14 Post-contractual and precontractual opportunism play significant roles in this analysis by affecting the ability of the entrepreneur to supervise internal contracts and to negotiate new contracts. Although not modeled explicitly, we know from the literature on opportunistic behavior, that transaction-specific investments, along with incomplete contracts, can affect both market governance power and internal governance power.
By focusing on limited attention, this model maintains the identification of internal contracts with direction by the entrepreneur, as suggested by Coase (1937) . This paper also maintains a distinction between firms and markets, in contrast to Alchian and Demsetz (1972) , by focusing on the two extremes of no involvement by the entrepreneur and direction by the entrepreneur. However, the firm is just one way of allocating the scarce resource of attention for the purposes of allocating other resources. Between these extremes lie many other long-term relationships that involve varying degrees of participation by the entrepreneur (Alchian 1984 , Baker, et al. 2002 . The firm is only another type of market, such as an internal labor market (Baker and Holmstrom 1995) or subeconomy (Holmstrom 1999) .
The delegation of greater responsibility to others (managers, employees, franchisees, and strategic partners) could increase the "amount of attention" and 14. See, for example, Spiller and Zelner (1997) and Weare (1996) . 
15. For example, see Gifford (1997) for an analysis of venture capital firms.
Rearranging terms yields the result. To prove that c ≤ d, assume that there is a c satisfying (A1) and that c ≥ d +1. Then r c < 0. The proof is attained by showing that the numerator of the right hand side of (2) is positive for any i. Collecting terms, using the fact that V i-1 < V d , and the fact that ρ i < ρ i-1 , we have the following. The numerator is equal to Therefore, we need to show that this maximum firm size is efficient and that there are larger firm sizes that are more valuable.
